Letters from Osama bin Laden`s last hideout show him worrying about mistakes made by his network`s affiliates, such as al-Shabaab, and the need to regain the trust of potential Muslim supporters.

Bin Laden seemed uninterested in recognising Somali-based al-Shabaab when the group pledged loyalty to him because he thought its leaders were poor governors of the areas they controlled and were too strict with their administration of Islamic penalties, like cutting off the hands of thieves.

Below is excerpts from Osama Bin Ladin`s documents:

Al-Shabab

Al-Shabab is not extensively discussed in the documents, but there are enough references that reflect Bin Ladin`s displeasure with the group`s style of governance. There is also a letter authored by Bin Ladin and addressed to the leader of al-Shabab, Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr. It seems that Abu al-Zubayr had sent a letter to Bin Ladin in which he requested formal unity with al-Qaeda and either consulted him on the question of declaring an Islamic state in Somalia or informed him that he was about to declare one.

On the question of formal unity with al-Qaeda, Bin Ladin politely declined, although he acknowledged that this is a “legal duty” (wajib shar`i), by which he meant that such a duty is incumbent upon all Muslims to work towards and implement when circumstances are conducive. Bin Ladin cited two reasons to explain why he discouraged formal unity. First, he indicated that it would give the “enemy” the excuse to mobilize its forces against Somalia; further, without formal unity, it would remain feasible for foreign aid to reach Muslims in need inSomalia. The second reason Bin Ladin cited is the extreme poverty in Somaliaas a result of ongoing wars. He further wanted to promote economic development to enhance people`s lives. “I am determined,” he wrote to Abu al-Zubayr, “to urge merchants in the Gulf states in one of my public statements to [invest] in effective and important developmental projects. These would not be too costly, we have already tested such projects inSudan. Thus the absence of a public affiliation between the jihadis [inSomalia] with al-Qaeda would strengthen the position of merchants who desire to help their [Muslim] brothers in Somalia.”

On the question of declaring a state (dawla), Bin Ladin advised against it. Yet if al-Shabab believed it was necessary to formalize their authority in Islamic terms, Bin Ladin suggested that the group declare an imara, an emirate/province, not a state, and call it “the Islamic Emirate of Somalia.” In Islamic political parlance, an imara is part of a broader Islamic state/dynasty; it is headed by an amir who is a representative of the caliph/greater imam. As with Yemen, Bin Ladin urged Abu al-Zubayr to restrain his ambitious plans. He concluded his letter to Abu al-Zubayr with gentle advice on governance: “[just as] I urge myself, I urge you to hold on to piety, patience, and perseverance and to adhere to noble characters, those to which when anamir adhere, the affairs of his citizenry would improve.” He further explained to Abu al-Zubayr that the leader`s wisdom is manifest through “his forgiveness, justice, patience and good relationship with his citizenry.” Bin Ladin`s advice is not for stylistic flourish; it is intended to signal to Abu al-Zubayr that his leadership is ultimately measured by how well Somalis are governed and their needs met.

Bin Ladin`s concern over al-Shabab`s mode of governance was explicitly articulated in a letter to `Atiyya. He asked `Atiyya to enquire from “the brothers in Somalia” about the economic situation of the states under their authority: “it does not escape you [Shaykh `Atiyya] that attending to people`s livelihood is an important objective, according to the Law, and it is one of the most important duties of the leader. It is therefore necessary to seek to create an economic force [in Somalia towards achieving this end].” Bin Ladin had apparently sent `Atiyya some suggestions on how to improve the economy, but `Atiyya either ignored them or had not attended to them.

In addition to al-Shabab`s neglect of building a viable economy, Bin Ladin was also worried about the group`s rigid approach to Islamic Law, specifically its inflexible application of the hudud, or deterrent penalties for certain crimes. He must have thought that the group was applying penalties with excess and asked `Atiyya to write “to our brothers in Somalia with some advice on how to deal with those whose offenses are ambiguous (al-mushtabah bihim) so that they may heed the prophetic hadith `avert the hadd penalties by means of ambiguous cases` (idra`u al-hudud bi-al-shubuhat).” Bin Ladin was referring here to a hadith, a report attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, which has served as a basis for jurists to avoid the imposition of severe penalties.

Bin Ladin`s letter to Abu al-Zubayr has echoes of the “it`s not you, it`s me” excuse. Why should he deny al-Shabab official membership in al-Qaeda yet still honor Abu al-Zubayr with a personal and cordial letter that he could have asked `Atiyya to write on his behalf? It is possible that he had been sending personal letters to other regional leaders, believing that even though he could not control them, it was still his duty to continue to advise them to change their ways, in which case his letter to Abu al-Zubayr would fit this pattern. It is also possible that Bin Ladin`s reasoning may not have been entirely noble; it may be that al-Shabab was trying to purchase its way into al-Qaeda. In what was probably his last letter, Bin Ladin asked `Atiyya to inform him of the “sums of money in support of jihadis coming from inside and outside Pakistan, and to itemize separately the sums arriving from each region; and of these to explain what happened with respect to the sum from the brothers in Somalia mentioned in your letter.”  In itself, the reference to a distinct sum fromSomalia is obviously not conclusive that al-Shabab was attempting topurchase use of the brand, but it may suggest that the sum from Somaliastood out in relation to others. If this is a plausible observation, then it might explain Bin Ladin`s position: although he was not prepared to “franchise” al-Qaeda`s brand, fearing that al-Shabab`s shortcomings would be a liability, he still deemed it necessary to be cordial to the leader of al-Shabab to ensure the group`s continued financial support of jihadi activities, (mis)leading Abu al-Zubayr to think that al-Shabab could eventually be granted membership. Nine months after Bin Ladin`s death, Ayman al-Zawahiri delivered to al-Shabab what Bin Ladin had denied them. Al-Zawahiri and Abu al-Zubayr released a public statement announcing the union between the two groups as a testimony that the “jihadi movement is growing with God`s help.”

Bin Ladin`s decision not to grant al-Shabab a public union with al-Qaeda is intriguing in another respect. A close reading of a related letter may suggest that Bin Ladin`s denial was the subject of internal debate within al-Qaeda and possibly behind his back. The author of the letter was concerned with the content of another letter to which he was made privy. He referred to it as the “letter of our friend” (risalat sahibina) and explained that:

…it is possible that the reason behind it is the fear of those brothers from the expansion and growth of the size of al-Qaeda, with God`s grace and power. They believe that being burdened by this expansive body is weighty on their neck and their capability cannot sustain it. It would make them liable to problems with many sides, especially since they desire or hope to pursue the path of construction and development. That is why they are satisfied with those who seek them, but do not see [the need] to go beyond that…That is why I believe it is necessary to affirm al-Qaeda`s ties to its branches and make it public as a fait accompli and useless to deny…Therefore, I hope that you would reconsider your decision of not declaring publicly the union with the brothers in Somalia simply because we might be pressured in the future to declare that we are not affiliated with them or others.

This letter suggests that Bin Ladin`s position was subject to internal criticism. The pursuit of “construction and development,” which Bin Ladin outlined in his letter to Abu al-Zubayr was atypical al-Qaeda discourse and was not welcomed by the author of this letter. Furthermore, it suggests that some were frustrated with Bin Ladin`s reluctance to welcome publicly groups pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda, accusing him of “being burdened by this expansive body” instead of seeing it as a sign of “God`s grace.” The only regional jihadi group that Bin Ladin publicly granted a formal affiliation is al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQI); all other groups that were formalized to be in the fold of al-Qaeda were announced by Ayman al-Zawahiri.

If Bin Ladin was in charge of al-Qaeda Central (AQC), the content of his correspondence suggests that he did not enjoy a symbiotic relationship with the affiliates on the operational front. The documents reveal that Bin Ladin was burdened by what he viewed as the affiliates` incompetence: specifically a lack of political acumen, an inability to win public support, and most importantly poorly planned operations that resulted in the deaths of thousands of Muslims. If AQC lacks the ability to exert control over its supposed affiliate groups — whether distant groups like AQAP or so called “fellow travelers” like the TTP that are active in the geographical space where it is based — it stands to reason that the power and clout AQC is meant to exert over the global jihadi landscape is most doubtful.

To read the whole document: CLICK Here

Source:www. biyokulule.com

]]> http://somalithinktank.org/somalia/feed/ 0 http://somalithinktank.org/rag-aan-raaxaysan/ http://somalithinktank.org/rag-aan-raaxaysan/#comments Thu, 22 Mar 2012 01:07:41 +0000 STT http://somalithinktank.org/?p=941 Haddii soomaalida la weydiin lahaa sababta ay dhibaatadu weligood u haysatey, oo uu dalkoodu u degi waayey, waxaa laga yaabaa in ay qaarba meel jawaabta la aadi lahaayeen.

Wadaaddada qaarkood waxay oran lahaayeen diintii Alle ayaa laga fogaadey oo sidaas ayey nababgelyola’aanta, faqriga iyo caqlixumadu inooku habsadeen. Waxaase su’aashaas ka hor imanaysa in soomaalida badankoodu ay tukadaan, soomaan, oo sakoodaan, isla markaas aan ummadda Jabbaan malaha qof muslim ah oo tukada lagu arag ayna nabadgelyo iyo dhaqaale fiican haystaan.

 Haddii in diinta islaamka laga fogaado colaad, gaajo iyo caaqnimo laga dhaxlo wuxuu malaha dalka adduunka ugu faqrisan oo ugu aqoon liitaa ahaan lahaa dalka Jarmalka, isla markaas la iskuma hayo in ay labada dal oo ugu hodansan  ahaan lahaayeen Afganistaan iyo Soomaaliya, waayo waa labo ummadood oo diinta Alle aad u jecel. Angoola iyo Soomaaliya sababta halaagga ka sintay, isla markaas Sucuudiga iyo Norway shidaalka ka sintay arrin diineed ma aha, oo qofkii colaadda iyo rafaadka Soomaaliya diin ku macneeya afkiisa ayaa daloola ee maskaxdiisu ma ay daloosho.

 Jawaabtaas midda ku xigta waxaa la shir-iman lahaa dad badan, oo waa in uu dhibta Soomaaliya baday madaxweynihii ugu danbeeyey mudane Maxame Siyaad Barre. Jawaabtaani sidii tii hore iskahadal ma aha, waxaase laga yaabaa in aysan run buuxda ahayn, hase yeesho ee baaritaan ayey u baahan tahay. Waxaa suurtagal ah in ay 50% in ka badan wax ka jiraan jawaabtaan, laakiin waxaa aad u adag in la helo dad bilow ilaa dhammaad si run ah oo aan eexasho lahayn u soo bandhigi kara in uu cudurku ninkaas ka yimid.

 Doodaha iman kara amaba taagan waxaa ka mid ah in la yiraahdo Itoobiya ayaa Soomaaliya sidaas u gashay, waxaase laga yaabaa in qofka sidaas u doodayaa uusan Soomaaliya iyo Itoobiya midna maskaxda ku hayn ee uu maqlay madaxda Soomaalida qaar  baa xariir la leh Itoobiya, oo uusan dooddiisa ku salaynayn wax uu qeexi karo, uuna yahay beelihii Carta taageersanaa ama shacabkii taageersanaa wadaaddadii Itixaad oo ay Itoobiya  sida xun u xasuuqday.

 Haddaba muran si gaar ah  loogu ximinayo madax ama beelo gaar  waxba lagama soo qaadi karo markii dhibaato taagan si cilmiyaysan looga doodayo. Haddii hadalka la soo koobo wax weyn baa ka jira in ay dhibaatada Soomaaliya dalal shisheeye weligood lug ku lahaayeen, waxaanse kala caddayn inta ay la’eg yihiin dhibaatooyinka ay Itoobiya inoo gaysatey iyo dibindaabyooyinka  ay Masar ina ku loggooysey. Reer galbeed, siiba Talyaani, iyo dalal iyo shakhsiyaad carab ah ayaa laftoodu lacago iyo waxyaalo kale muddo dheer qubayey, Itoobiyana waa dalka xudduudda ugu dheer Soomaaliya la leh, oo dano waaweyn bay inaka xurubsan kartaa.Laakiin in ay beel kastaa dalkii ay lacag iyo hub ka qaadato inta ka aamusto , dalalka kale  oo Soomaaliya danaha ka  fushanaya gaar u caydo.  ma aha dood adag oo loo cuskan karo dhibaatooyinka Soomaaliya.

 Arrimahaas aynu sheegnay iyo kuwo kale oo aad u badan ayey ku doodaan dadka badankoodu. Haddaba mowduucyadaan iyo kuwa la midka ahi aad ayey u xiiso beeleen, lagumana kala garqaato, laakiin waxaa jira meelo kale oo ay u weecdaan dadka falsafadda lihi. Meelahaasi waa kuwo uusan qofka caadiga ah oo caamayga ahi filan karin in loo aaneeyo dhibaatada Soomaaliya, laakiin waa mowduucyo ka xiiso badan kuwa ay jabhadaha iyo beeluhu isku caayaan oo lagu daaley, sida Itoobiya, Masar iyo Sucuudiga.

 Doodaha falsafada ku saleysan  waxay aragtiyahooda u dhiibtaan si ka macaan, kana soojiidasho weyn in lagu daalo Itoobiya iyo Masar, ama uu qabiil kastaa midka kale eed dhabarka u saaro, oo la isku danbaabo.

 Waxaa laga yaabaa in uu akhristuhu la yaabo ama uu argagaxo haddii falsafadu inoo  sheegto in ay dhibaatada dalkeenna rafaadisay ka timid gudniinka gabdhaha! ”Haddii ay laabtu meel jirto indhuhu waxba ma arkaan” waa maahmaah loo daliishan karo in ay laabta shacabku dagaal iyo qabyaalad la ciirciirayso oo uusan falsafad boos uga bannaanayn, taasina waxay keeni kartaa in falsafada dhibaatada ina haysata inoo sheegaysa aynu ka jecel nahay nin afgarooc ah oo idaacad been ka sheegaya. Haddaba arrintaas ah in gudniinka dumarku uu dhibaatooyinka ina xanuujiyey inoo soo jiidey ayuu  maqaalkan kooban si falsadaysan ugu nuuxnuusan doonaa, asagoo soo bandhigaya in gudniinka gabdhuhu uu qayblibaax ka qaatay dhibaatada Boorama ilaa  Baraawe ku habsatey.

 Falsafadu, sida wadaaddada diinla’aanta cuskaday iyo beelaha Itoobiya iyo Masar caaya, iskama hadlayso   ee waxay  miiska soo saaraysaa daliilo caddaynaya in uu gudniinka gabdhuhu sababay in ay heshiin waayeen beelaha Soomaaliya, oo ay dadka hubka ka dhigi waayeen. Falsafadu sidan quruxda badan ayay doodeeda u soo bandhigaysaa:

“Degganaanshaha bulshada waxaa saldhig weyn u ah dumarka, waxayna gabdhaha soomaaliyeed yaraantooda ka walwalaan in uu gudniin xanuun badani sugayo, oo habeenkii si fiican uma ay seexdaan. Arrintaasi waxay hor istaagtaa in ay koraan qaybo badan oo maskaxda gabdhaha ka mid ahi, waxayna hanaqaadaan ayaga oo qalbila’. Markii la gudo waxay waayaan dareenkii dadnimada oo waxay noqdaan sidii lab xaniinyihii laga bixiyey. Weli ma aynu arag rag la dhufaanay, laakiin xoolaha markii la xaniinyobixiyo waxay waayaan kartiyo badan oo ay lahaayeen markii ay qoorta ahaayeen. Kartiyahaas waxaa ka mid ah in uu jirkoodu dhaddig oo kale noqdo. Sidaas darteed dhaddiga laftiisa haddii sida soomaalida loo gudo, oo naagnimada laga jaro, wuxuu jirkoodu u dhawaanayaa jirka labka, oo dhaddignimadii baa ka guuraysa. Xagga muuqaalka iyo xagga dareenkaba dumarka naagnimadii laga gooyey waxaa dhimanaysa naagnimadoodii. Isla markaas waxay u fakarayaan sida raggii oo waa dad sirgaxan, oo markii la guursado aan dabacsanayn oo qawaaban. Haddii lala hadlo waxay u jawaabayaan sida nin oo kale, haddii la taabtana wax ay dareemayaan lama arko. Maskaxda iyo jirkaba waxay dhibaato weyni kaga dhacday subixii naagnimada laga xaabiyey, oo waa ay dhufaanan yihiin! Raggu waxay u baahan yihiin sheeko dumar, oo dumarnimadii gabdhaha soomaalida waa laga qaaday, oo sheego xiiso uma ay hayaan! Waxay nimanku u baahan yihiin raaxo oo weligiis qof dumar ah oo dhamaystiran raggeennu lama ay kulmin! Sidaas awgeed ayey labadii soomaali ah oo isguursadaa weligood in ay wiilal dhalaan keli ah uga fakaraayeen, maxaa yeelay wax kale kama ay dhexeeyaan. Wiilashii la dhalay oo malaayiinta ahaa markii ay naago u raaxeeya waayeen bay xanaaqeen, waxayna bilaabeen dagaal aan weligiis dhammaanayn. Ilaa ay helaan dumar aan gudnayn oo u sheekeeya, una raaxeeya dagaalku waa uu sii xoogoobayaa”.

 Ha ka xumaan  falsafada  haddii aad dumar tahay, ogowna in ay bulshada, hooyadaa iyo aabbahaa denbi kaa galeen, ee aysan  falsafadu waxba kuu dhimin, balse ay kaaga digeyso in aad carruurtaada denbi ka gashid. Haddii aad rag tahay adiga noloshii raaxadu waa ay ku dhaaftay, ee bal carruurtaada iyo carruurtooda ku dadaal in ay raaxaystaan, oo ay dagaalka ka nastaan! Sida falsafada ay inoo  caddeeynayso nabadda Soomaaliya waxay ku xiran tahay in aadan gabdhahaaga gudin.

 Dastuurka qaranka waxaa lagu qoraa in uusan madaxweynuhu guursan xaas ajnebi ah, waana arrin laga naxo! Haddii ninkii dalka hoggaamin lahaa loo diido in uu gabar aan la gudin Kenya ama Uganda ka soo guursado si uu u raaxaysto, oo uu naftiisa ololaysa u qaboojiyo maxaa la faa’iidey?!

 Sida  falsafadu inoo sheegeyso, raggu waxay dagaalka joojin doonaan markii gabdhaha gudniinka laga daayo oo ay koraan, oo ay ragga dejiyaan. Haddaba maanta lama hayo gabdho aan gudnayn oo xildhibaannada, wasiirrada iyo madaxweynaha dejiya si aysan colaadda u sii wadin oo aysan shacabka ceelasha uga xabaalin. Guddoomiyeyaasha maxkamadaha iyo saraakiisha qudhoodu in ay dad xanaaqsan oo uu gurigoodu ololayo noqdaan ma fiicna, oo waa in la qaboojiyaa! Yaase qaboojinaya haddii uu dastuurku gabdhihii loo baahnaa madaxda ka mamnuucay?

Sida aan deeqaha iyo kaalmooyinka midowga Yurub iyo Ameerika looga maarmayn ayaan looga maarmayn in lala xidido dalal shisheeye sida Itoobiya, waayo carabuhu inama ay rabaan oo ”Addoomo madmadow” bay inoo yaqaanniin!

 Sidee bay ku dhici kartaa in la mamnuuco xaasas ajnebi ah?! Sow taasi ma aha in uusan dagaalku weligiis dhammaan?! Dadku markii ay dhaawac qabaan waa la baantaa, waana in madaxda soomaalida lagu baantaa gabdho ajnebi ah si ay nolosha u dhedhemiyaan oo dagaalka uga tanaasulaan. Xataa madaxda dhaqanka waa in gabdho Afrikada aan gudnayn ama Tayland looga soo guuriyaa si ay inta u qaboobaan gar caddaalad ah u gooyaan, oo ay eexda iyo qabyaaladda ummadda uga daayaan.

 Malaayiin nin oo aan weligood raaxaysan baa soomaaliya isku laynaya, oo waa in marka hore madaxda loo guuriyaa, waxaase dhibaato ah in uu madaxda Soomaalida midka ugu yari 50 sano dhaafay, oo cimrigii ay guursan lahaayeenba uu waa hore ahaa. Ragga dalka isku laynaya badankoodu 70 sano ayey jiraan, oo gabdho cusub oo Tanzanian ah tabar uma ay hayaan, hase yeeshoo ee waxay soo guursan karaan habro ayaga gedohooda ah, oo aan gudnayn si ay u qaboobaan. Xasaskoodi hore haddii ay masayraan loo hakan mayo, waayo arrinta loo socdo ayaa wax walba ka weyn, oo dalka ayaa colaadda laga daminayaa!

]]> http://somalithinktank.org/rag-aan-raaxaysan/feed/ 1 http://somalithinktank.org/the-saga-of-somali-piracy/ http://somalithinktank.org/the-saga-of-somali-piracy/#comments Mon, 05 Mar 2012 11:42:58 +0000 STT http://somalithinktank.org/?p=937

A danger foreseen is half avoided. -Thomas Fuller-Gnomologia

It was reported in the media that a Sri Lankan delegation was expected to travel to Somalia to negotiate the release of six Sri Lankan fishermen abducted by Somali pirates.

Somali Pirates Picture Courtesy: www.blogcritic.org

The Somali pirates, who have demanded the meeting with the Sri Lankan Authorities, abducted the fishermen four months ago when they trespassed into Somalian territorial waters in a trawler owned by a businessman. The pirates, who initially demanded a ransom of $6 million, threatened to kill the fishermen if their demands were not met.
The fishermen live on their daily earnings and barely make their ends meet. Minister of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Rajitha Senaratne said that a Somali man, who had visited Colombo last year to buy a boat and has ties with the pirates, is currently negotiating the release of the hostages.
The same man negotiated the release of 12 Sri Lankan fishermen captured last year managing to get a similar ransom demand forfeited. “We have been assured that the fishermen are alive. We have sent the images of the six fishermen and negotiations are underway to have them released,” said Minister Senaratne.
However, whether the release would come with a price, or could be negotiated without any payment like last year will depend  on the discussions between the pirates and the Lankan delegation. The Somali government has refused to get itself involved in the matter as they have no connection with the pirates, said the minister.
Despite travel plans, the delegation that would comprise representatives of the Fisheries Ministry, the Sri Lankan negotiator and family members of the fishermen are unsure of procedures. “Matters have become a bit complicated now. The pirates are infighting and have divided into several groups, so we are having a bit of trouble figuring out with which group our fishermen are captives with,” said the minister.(Khaleej Times)
The saga of Somali piracy goes on without end, perpetuated by periodical, sensational media stories of daring rescues, multimillion-dollar ransoms or shocking violence.
The world watches confused, while the scale, number and brutality of the attacks steadily increase. They are now more frequent and violent than ever before. The international community has yet to develop any serious strategy. There’s a stubborn unwillingness to take a comprehensive approach to Somali piracy, to investigate its root causes and work from there.
In 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton brushed off any suggestion that Somali piracy could be solved by addressing its root causes. “You have got to put out the fire before you can rebuild the house. But, right now, we have a fire raging.” Two years later, it is clear that Ms. Clinton’s comments amounted to a misdiagnosis.
The fire is burning hotter than ever, and the house still lies in shambles. Her statement embodies the key error of the international response. It views Somali piracy solely through the prism of security, believing that the problem can be contained and subdued through the use of military force.
The Somali transitional government’s foreign minister, Mohammed Abdulahi Omar Asharq, has been one of the rare voices to state the truth that is both obvious and curiously absent from public discussion: The solution to the problem of Somali piracy is to be found on land, not at sea.“ The world has so far only responded with containment. This is not productive, or effective, or practical, or morally defensible,” Mr. Asharq told a counter-piracy conference in Dubai in April. This sentiment was echoed by Augustine Mahiga, the United Nations Secretary-General’s special representative for Somalia. “The approach to it must first and foremost be political. … There cannot be a military solution.”(Internet)
Implicit in these comments is an acknowledgment that Somali piracy did not arise suddenly or unexpectedly. For almost two decades now, foreign trawlers have poached in Somali territorial waters. Fish stocks have been decimated and coastal regions deprived of their main source of both income and sustenance. European and Asian corporations have been dumping toxic waste off Somalia’s coast, poisoning the water and the people who live near it. Corrupt government officials, treated as legitimate partners by international organisations, siphon development aid and accept kickbacks from the pirates, ensuring that their activities will continue unabated.
The first Somali pirates were men from the afflicted coastal communities, jobless and starving, who organised themselves into groups to demand payment from interlopers in their waters. It did not take long for the less well-intentioned – mainland gangs and warlords – to sniff out the lucrative opportunities and muscle in on the act.
They brought with them the criminal organisation and violence we are seeing increase every day. These are all facts critical to understanding Somali piracy. They are also rarely reported on. It took attacks on international shipping lanes and pleasure craft for us to sit up and take notice.
The first and most critical step is for the international community to recognise that the solution to Somali piracy will not be met by military measures. A real solution will require a comprehensive strategy, including elements of political reform, security and economic development.
It will need to fight corruption endemic to the key coastal regions of the country, to develop honest and motivated local partners. It will need to help replace the job opportunities wiped out by the destruction of the fishing industry. It will need to provide the security and stability necessary for international organisations to operate safely and help rebuild devastated coastal communities.
Until these measures are taken, pirate gangs will have a steady supply of recruits – young men, unemployed, hungry and desperate – drawn by easy money unavailable to them through honest means. The solution to Somali piracy will be found on land, and will need to address the problem’s root causes, not its symptoms. It is evident that in order to eradicate this menace, effective measures should be taken to remove the causes.
Recently it was reported in the media that ex-navy personnel and commandos have been recruited by a businessman in Sri Lanka, who has commenced a business of providing security to vulnerable vessels. It is time that the Government of Sri Lanka recognises that the lives of our fishermen are in grave danger and devise effective means of protecting our fisher-folk.

Source:www.thesundayleader.lk

The gathering of world leaders in London last week to consider the fate of Somalia may be heralding a new development moment for the war-torn country. But we are in unchartered waters: we know very little about Somalia’s economy.

First, from a development viewpoint, there is no such thing as one Somalia. Ironically, the unrecognized Somaliland entity [see the Somaliland success story in “Yes Africa Can” ] has enjoyed stability and democratic governance, pursuing classic development interventions (service delivery through the state, infrastructure investment, capacity building …). [In addition, Somaliland appears to have very good statistics.]

By contrast, South Central Somalia, where the capital city and official -albeit transition- government of Somalia are located, is a quintessential failed state plagued by conflict and public mismanagement. Puntland lies somewhere in between, with some stability but an embryonic state under growing influence of piracy networks.

Figure 1: Somalia economic growth (click to it larger)

Alas, the scant (and shaky) data on Somalia typically does not allow for geographic distinctions. Still it highlights a few surprising trends and the shortcomings of the current aid model there.

Somalia appears to have experienced modest economic growth (to the tune of 2-3%) since the late 1990s. This could be reflecting high levels of activity in Somaliland and/or good performance in ‘niche’ markets such as banking, telecoms, security (of the type that need very little state involvement or infrastructure to prosper). Much of this is growth comes from consumption, driven by massive inflows of external resources.

Even though Somalia is a major exporter of livestock, exports remain a small fraction (about a fifth) of total imports. Nonetheless, the existence and persistence of a small but vibrant private sector suggests that Somalia could very well take-off economically if the conflict abated and governance improved.

Figure 2: Somalia GDP per capita

Whatever growth has happened has not translated into much development. Poverty remains rampant:  43% and 73% of the population live below $1 and $2 per day respectively.  In GDP per capita terms, Somalia is close to the bottom of African nations. On two critical outcomes for health (under 5 years mortality of 180 deaths per 1000 births) and education (average primary school enrollment at 22%), it performs dismally.

This is in spite of massive external inflows of cash in the form of remittances, ODA and military assistance. ODA alone was almost nine times the combined estimated budgets of Somaliland, Puntland and the TFG in 2009. ODA per capita stood at $75 per capita (excluding military aid) against an average of $36 for fragile states. Remittances, which reached an estimated $1 billion in 2011, represent an inflow of $110 per capita.

Figure 3: Somalia consumption (click on it to see it larger)

Humanitarian assistance, which has been mobilized on a massive scale, can also be a mixed blessing. Even before the recent famine in the Horn of Africa, humanitarian assistance accounted for 66% of all ODA to Somalia. It has provided life-saving support to millions of Somali. But it has failed to tackle and possibly even exacerbated the man-made dimension of the crisis.

The opaque governance environment in which it has been planned, allocated and delivered has benefited those very politicians, warlords and businessmen that have been the source of the problem. For instance, theft and diversion of food aid –which made global headlines in the context of the recent dramatic drought- has been a longstanding issue in Somalia, directly fueling a war economy vested in the status quo.

With improved prospects for political and military stabilization, the development space is opening up in Somalia. But success will depend largely on a better understanding of Somalia’s economy –including its regional characteristics- and the political ramifications of aid.

Source: http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/stabilizing-somalia-the-development-moment

At first I withheld judgment on the British government’s decision to hold a major international conference on Somalia. It was so good to hear the government at last taking an interest in this battered country, so I thought it would have been perverse to pour cold water on it.

From the start it was clear that piracy and the subsequent cost to the City of London’s marine insurance business, as well as the fear of terrorism, were the main drivers for David Cameron’s concern. The interests of the Somali people were always going to be secondary. Since Britain had done nothing during the past 20 years of war and suffering, it seemed unlikely that concern for Somalis would be the top priority.

But I am shocked at the government’s lack of understanding. Reading the reports of the conference, one would think that the cause of the war was Al Shabaab, the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Hilary Clinton spoke as if this was simply an extension of the American war or terror.

But the roots of Somalia’s state failure lie in its social structure not in Islamic extremism. When the civil war, or rather wars, started back in the late 1980s Shabaab did not exist. The wars were clan-based uprisings against a domineering dictatorship in a centralised state and against the dictator’s clan. That fragmentation of Somali society still exists beneath the surface. But this was hardly mentioned.

As order, security and hope were obliterated by clan warfare, leading to impoverishment, hunger and death, people turned to religion. Saudi funded fundamentalism spread rapidly throughout Somalia. It is hardly surprising that many young people who had never know anything but war and misery felt the appeal of the simplistic answers of fundamentalism.

Furthermore, Cameron does not appear to have learned from Britain’s own experience in Northern Ireland and the decolonisation process of the 1960s. In both cases Westminster tried to build coalitions of moderates and exclude the extremists and “men of violence”. But in the end in Northern Ireland peace came when the extremists were brought into the process, just as Britain 40 years earlier had been forced to release the jailed ‘terrorists’ throughout its empire and hand power to them.

Not inviting elements of Shabaab to London (and threatening to continue bombing them) has ensured that the war will continue. Excluding the Eritreans, major players in Somalia was also a mistake.

This conference was predicated on persuading the present but ineffective Somali politicians who form the Transitional Federal Government to step down. This is a nice dream, but Somali politicians are not known to commit hari kiri. They are better known for living in luxurious Nairobi hotels, talking at internationally funded conferences and chewing khat. A recent audit of aid money given to them said that 96% was unaccounted for.

The agenda of the Somali politicians at Lancaster House on Thursday was clear: to get the British and Americans to fight their war for them or pay others to do it and bomb their enemies. That will enable them to hold office – even though they have little power – and keep stealing the aid.

The parts of Somalia that work and are safe have evolved their own structures and agreements with their neighbours and rivals. Somalia’s social structure is unique and still very powerful and the systems Puntland and Somaliland are built on them. No such system has emerged in the south of the country which includes the capital – the only part of Somali still at war.

This conference should never have attempted to deal with anything more than helping to establish effective local government in the ports along the eastern seaboard and thereby providing a base for controlling piracy.

The attempt to reestablish a strong Somali state was a mistake. It will fail.

Richard Dowden is Director of the Royal African Society.

Source: www.allafrica.com

The term “failed state” was coined by President George W Bush to be the byword of US policy in Somalia. The country was put on the list of those associated with terrorism and, thereafter, any country that risked relations with Somalia was subject to American sanctions.

As a result, the international community was dissuaded from having dealings with Somalia, and it became isolated. America’s attitude encouraged north-east African powers to perpetuate their strategy of destabilisation, giving them licence to settle accounts with Somalia under the pretext of combating terrorism. They hoped to demoralise the Somalis, to plunge them into a state of despair from which they would never again try to rise.

Yet Somalia is not a failed state. It was defeated by the weight of the resources at its adversaries’ disposal, but never succumbed. And it is still fighting for emancipation and self-determination.

Yes, there is warlordism, terrorism, piracy, and a history of natural disaster. Yes, displacement, refugees and a lack of state authority are problematic. But these issues result directly from sustained foreign intervention and the deliberate fragmentation of the country into fiefdoms, enclaves and tribal territories.

That the conflict in Somalia has a local dimension – rooted in oppression, nepotism, exclusion, injustice, lack of economic opportunity and civil disobedience – is impossible to ignore. But without foreign interference, local issues would be less critical; they could be managed and controlled. The reality is that the big powers have relied on Ethiopia, their major ally in Africa, to decide their strategies in the Horn of Africa.

William Hague, the UK foreign secretary, implicitly conceded as much in a speech before the Somali community at Chatham House earlier this month. He said: “We know the international community has not always got it right in the past and that we can easily make mistakes, even when our intentions are good.”

Irrespective of the lack of government regulation and protection, Somalis have formed networks – both within the country and across borders and continents – that are bound together by ties of family and trust. Two major financial institutions that emerged out of the ashes of the destruction are Dahabshiil international bank and Salama bank. Both have their head offices in Djibouti for legal and security reasons. Their services cover all Somalis and all regions to the tiniest village, a feat that would have been impossible under the old government.

With the help of such initiatives, Somali capital has migrated to Kenya and Dubai, where Somalis excel in every field. In Dubai, they are the biggest re-exporter after the Iranians. In Kenya, they have competed successfully with the Asian business community and achieved significant results in telecommunications, money transfers, transport and real estate. Their business networks extend to the Middle East, South Africa, Tanzania, South Sudan, Congo and Central Africa. The private sector and non-governmental organisations have supplanted the administration in offering services such as education, health and manufacturing.

“Somalis worldwide provide more than $1bn in remittances back to Somalia each year – more than the international community provides in aid,” Hague pointed out in his Chatham House speech.

What’s more, Somalis inject $1bn annually into the economy of Kenya. This is variously due to the high returns offered by Kenya’s economy, partnerships with Kenyan Somalis, the sharing of 800km of common border, and Kenya’s role as an outlet for Somalia’s informal economy.

Livestock and agriculture were the mainstays of the Somali economy before the collapse of the state, accounting for around 50% of GDP. And despite the lack of regulation and government protection – and the chaos, natural disasters and fierce competition from highly advanced economies such as Australia and Argentina – Somalia’s livestock exports have doubled in comparison to 1990 levels.

Neither are the positives confined to economics and agriculture. Somalis in the diaspora have impressive entrepreneurial skills and are highly educated and talented. Nuruddin Farah, a novelist and university professor in South Africa, was a candidate for the Nobel prize for literature. Dr Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf is a judge at the international court of justice. A song by the world famous rapper K’naan was chosen as the official anthem of the football World Cup in South Africa. And distance runner Mo Farah, who is also a British citizen, is the 5,000-metre world champion.

Moreover, Somalia has enormous natural resources. It has two as yet untapped rivers. It has 8m hectares of cultivable land. It has a 3,000km coastline, the longest in Africa, full of marine resources. It possesses huge deposits of uranium and other precious minerals. Last but not least, Somalia has substantial reserves of oil and gas; in fact, its reservoir of black gold is understood to be the second biggest in Africa.

Clearly, despite the challenges encountered by Somalia over the past 20 years, the country has a lot to offer. It is capable of a rebirth and will one day stand on its feet again to pursue the march of progress, restoring its dignity and assuming equal status with other members of the international community.

• Mohamed Sharif Mohamud is the former ambassador of Somalia and the Arab League

Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk

The London Conference on Somalia has received a surprising amount of publicity at a time when economic turmoil in Greece and unrest in Syria are pressing international concerns.

FEBRUARY 23rd has been the biggest day in Somalia’s recent history. There is an expectation that today’s London conference on Somalia, organised by the British government and backed by almost all interested parties, will give the benighted country a chance to move forward. That does not mean that it will necessarily pull together. Asour story in this week’s paper makes clear, the plan is to give up on a centralised state, for now, and to concentrate instead strengthening local rule. But in order for Somalia to have any chance of making a cantonal arrangement of six or seven regions work, it must first get some important things right. Donors can play their part by coughing up cash and trying to make sure it is spent correctly, but Somalis have to do much better than they have done so far (though the country has not been without heroes; many courageous and tolerant Somalis have been killed by jihadists and warlords, often dying without any recognition from the outside world). For Baobab, the main challenges can be broken down into security, food and business.

Security: The London conference has to come up with ways to hammer Shabab bomber and sniper units, while creating opportunities to draw moderate Islamists into local administrations. The announcement, on February 10th, that the Shabab have officially joined al-Qaeda is unlikely to result in much of an operational surge. Indeed, it may present an opportunity to get on side those fighters who are more interested in Somalia than in waging global jihad. The Shabab are on the back foot. It is having to defend its territory from Kenyan forces in the south, Ethiopia and its proxies in the west, and from African Union troops in Mogadishu. The Kenyans have succeeded in repelling the Shabab from their border (although Shabab fighters still slip through to kidnap or kill Kenyans). The group has so far deterred an assault on their stronghold of Kismayo by threatening a bombing campaign in Kenya, which would wreck tourism and scare off foreign investment there.

Those conferring today need to address two immediate security challenges. The first is to limit the influence of Eritrea, which has often acted against the interests of ordinary Somalis by assisting the jihadists. The second is to help local Somalis and Kenyan forces to secure the buffer state of “Jubaland” along  the Kenyan border, about 100km inland. Investment in education, health and jobs in Jubaland would encourage Somali refugees in the Dadaab refugee camp, just inside Kenya, to return home. It would also make northern Kenya safer and enable work to start planned oil drilling, a new super-port at Lamu, and a new city for 1m people.

Food: The second area the conference has to get right is food production. Somalia is a hungry country, reliant on food aid and commercial imports of wheat, pasta and oil. Its old Italian banana and tomato plantations are in ruins. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Shabab still control most of the country’s breadbasket. The United Nations says 80,000 Somalis may have perished in last year’s famine. Conditions have improved considerably, but 2.3m people are still in need of assistance. The UN humanitarian chief for Somalia, Mark Bowden, says the priority is getting displaced people to return home from tented camps around Somalia, as well as from Dadaab: the World Food Programme claims to feed 400,000 people in and around Mogadishu alone. The Shabab have tentatively supported the idea of returns; they emphasise self-reliance. However, many displaced people were driven from their farms by the Shabab and fear runs deep.

Business: The third and most important area to address is business. Here there is plenty of reason to hope, not least because of the acumen of its traders, bankers and entrepreneurs. Donors need to build on this money-making instinct by supplying capital for loans to medium-sized Somali companies. “I want to see more carrots and less sticks,” says a Somali businessman. Investments would need to be varied, including industrial equipment for fishing companies and frankincense exporters, and an overhaul of the country’s destructive charcoal business to make it more sustainable. Somalis are also surprisingly nerdy. The country is one of the most advanced in Africa in terms of mobile phone and internet usage. That can be further encouraged by subsidising the cost of data uploads on mobile phones as well as paying for fibre-optic cables to be laid down.

The foremost investments, though, will have to be in livestock. Trade in cattle, camels, sheep and goats account for about half of Somalia’s exports. The country exported record numbers of animals last year, despite the famine. According to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation, $250m worth went to Saudi Arabia during the haj. The Saudis say they want to double that figure by 2013. A $50m investment to establish a national system of watering and veterinary points for animals being marched through the desert looks like a bargain, if it helps win over pastoralists.

Many Somali businesses can prosper without a helping hand. Take Somali money-transfer firms. The biggest of these is Dahabshiil. The Anglo-Somali outfit says its 5000 employees move most of the $1.6 billion in remittances to Somalia each year. The company’s boss, Abdirashi Duale, reckons the future of his company—and of Somalia itself—lies in the growing trade between African countries. He is expanding across Africa and hoping for a bigger share of the continent’s $40 billion in remittances. Similarly, connections abroad give Somali import and export companies an edge in selling electronics and household goods across Africa. That will probably continue even as they move to “regularise” their companies.

The cantonal arrangement does, however, look shaky in another way: taxes. How will they be paid? To whom? Direct taxes look to be a non-starter. Indirect taxes will be hard to administer. What happens if oil drilling goes ahead in Puntland? What kind of revenues should it send to Mogadishu? Does the oil, in fact, belong to Somalia at all, or only to the Puntlanders? Everyone agrees that the services provided by the new republic should be minimal, but how minimal? That raises a host of other questions. Should the revived republic have a navy? Who will run the central bank? Who will decide how many Somali shillings to print? Those in Mogadishu close to the transitional federal government argue for the trappings of state—but the argument seems to have moved decisively beyond that.

Source: http://www.economist.com

UK Prime Minister David Cameron has managed to convince some of the world’s most powerful people, including UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to come to London because Somalia is seen as the world’s most comprehensively failed state, representing a threat to itself, the Horn of Africa region and the wider world.

The conference will focus on three issues that have already had far-reaching and devastating consequences: Piracy, terrorism and famine.

But away from the headlines and the stereotypical media images of skeletal children, skinny pirates in tiny skiffs, and gun-wielding Islamist insurgents, their heads wrapped in black and white scarves, there is another side to the Somali story that is positive, enterprising and hopeful.

Remarkable things are happening which could serve as models for a new start.

It may come as a surprise that, despite coming top of the world’s Failed State Index for the past four years in a row, Somalia ranks in the top 50% of African countries on several key development indicators.

A study by the US-based Independent Institute found that Somalia came near the bottom on only three out of 13 indicators: Infant mortality; access to improved water resources and immunisation rates.

It came in the top 50% in crucial indicators like child malnutrition and life expectancy, although this may have changed since last year’s famine.

“Far from chaos and economic collapse, we found that Somalia is generally doing better than when it had a state,” said the institute.

“Urban businessmen, international corporations, and rural pastoralists have all functioned in a stateless Somalia, achieving standards of living for the country that are equal or superior to many other African nations.”

‘Freewheeling capitalism’

Of course many people in Somalia have suffered horribly during the past 20 years of state collapse, but some sectors of the economy, both traditional and modern, are positively booming.

It may come as another surprise that two northern Somali ports account for 95% of all goat and 52% of all sheep exports for the entire East African region.

According to the London-based Chatham House think-tank, the export of livestock through these ports, and the nearby port of Djibouti, represents what “is said to be the largest movement of live animal – ‘on the hoof’ – trade anywhere in the world”.

I recently visited one of these ports, Berbera, in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, where port manager Ali Xoorxoor told me: “I expect livestock exports from the port to increase dramatically from three million head of livestock in 2011 to 4.5 million in 2012.

“This is because of healthy demand from the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, and new markets emerging in Egypt, Syria and Oman. The Egyptians are especially fond of our camels, mainly for meat.”

The livestock trade has exploded since Somalia’s government imploded in 1991.

One trader told me exports from the northern ports alone is worth more than $2bn (£1.3bn) a year; this does not appear to be an exaggeration, when one considers that just one sheep is worth at least $30 and a camel several hundred.

Academic Peter Little found what he described as a “spectacular surge” in cross-border cattle trade from Somalia to Kenya, where cattle sales in the Kenyan town of Garissa, near the border with Somalia, grew by an “astounding” 600% in the years following the collapse of central authority.

In his book, Somalia: Economy without State, Mr Little describes how “a freewheeling, stateless capitalism” has flourished in the country.

A trend-setting boutique in Hargeisa is one of several innovative businesses

On their way to market, Somali nomads drive their livestock through hundreds of kilometres of harsh, hostile terrain, much of it occupied by militias including the Islamist group, al-Shabab.

These nomads know how to negotiate their way through enemy territory; perhaps they have a thing or two to teach Somali politicians and international agencies struggling to get aid to those who need it most.

Cold Coca-Cola

Another traditional area of the Somali economy which has thrived in a stateless society, and could serve as a useful model, is the khat trade, worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year.

This narcotic leaf, grown in Kenya and Ethiopia, is delivered fresh, with tremendous efficiency, to remote parts of Somalia, including those affected by drought and famine.

Special “khat planes”, pick-up trucks and people on foot ensure khat gets to market before noon, the day after it is picked.

Otherwise, the khat-chewers will not buy it.

The local authorities and international aid agencies could learn something from those in the khat business about how to deliver supplies, perhaps of food, medicine and other essential items, to difficult and dangerous areas.

As Somali analyst Nuradin Dirie says: “The khat network reaches every corner of Somalia every day of the year and doesn’t stop for wars, drought, floods, epidemics, Friday prayers, Ramadan – anything really.

“I suggested to the UN that it could make use of khat networks to vaccinate children as this would create an opportunity for 100% vaccination coverages.

Khat users insist on having fresh leaves to chew – so it must be delivered soon after harvesting

“Of course I did not succeed,” he says.

“I have travelled quite a lot inside Somalia. To little villages and big towns, to far away rural areas and to remote coastal outposts.

“Wherever I go, I always manage to get a cold Coca-Cola. If they can store cool Coca-Cola, there is a strong possibility they can handle vaccinations too.”

Other more modern sectors of the economy are also thriving.

Somalia has one of the cheapest, most efficient mobile phone networks in Africa.

It is home to Dahabshiil, one of the largest money transfer companies on the continent, which together with other remittance outfits, delivers some $2bn worth of remittances to Somali territories a year, according to the UN.

Like the khat traders, remittance companies deliver money to remote and treacherous places all over Somalia.

Can-do attitude

Some humanitarian groups use these companies to deliver cash-for-food and other forms of assistance; perhaps more use could be made of these pre-existing remittance networks, which link Somalis together, wherever they are in the world, connecting them in a matter of minutes.

Many Somali camels are exported to Egypt, where they are highly prized

There is a startling contrast between the productive, can-do attitude of the Somali business community, and the sometimes obstructive, counter-productive approach of the politicians.

Members of the Somali diaspora, and those who stayed behind during the long years of conflict, are doing daring, imaginative and positive things.

A group of British-educated brothers from the self-declared republic of Somaliland has built a Coca-Cola bottling plant amongst the sand, anthills and cacti, creating a surreal environment of green lawns, gleaming white walls, glossy red paint, and polished factory floors.

A pioneering young woman has recently set up an art gallery in Hargeisa.

Another has opened up a boutique, where smartly dressed attendants sell shoes, handbags, brightly coloured lingerie, and men’s and women’s clothes in the very latest Somali fashion.

A man in Mogadishu runs a Billiards and Snooker Federation.

There are also political models and inspirations on offer within the Somali territories.

The most striking is Somaliland, which broke away from Somalia in 1991, and has built itself up from war-torn rubble into probably the most democratic polity in the Horn of Africa.

It has done this on its own, from the bottom-up, combining the old with the new, to create a political system that gives authority to clan elders as well as those elected by the public.

The Somali business community and places like Somaliland have “worked” because they have married the best of the traditional and the modern.

Much that has “failed” in Somalia is a result of combining the “bad”, divisive things about the traditional clan system with dangerous modern elements, especially weapons.

It might be more productive for anyone interested in helping Somalia back onto its feet, including those at the London Conference, to deal with and learn from the business community instead of the politicians.

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17080664

British Ambassador to Somalia, Nairobi

February 10, 2012